The Gilded Cage: Techno-State Capitalism in China (forthcoming with Princeton University Press in fall 2023)
The Gilded Cage analyzes the emergent post-industrial society in China currently taking shape due significantly to the Chinese state’s aggressive pursuit of science and technology (S&T)-driven socioeconomic development in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. This period has seen the transformation of the Chinese state, the unprecedented rise of tech capital, the evolution of an asymmetrical yet symbiotic—synergetic yet disciplinary—relationship between the state and tech capital, and, critically, an increasingly prostrate public sphere and civil society.
I develop the concept of the “gilded cage” to capture not so much a literal space as the dynamic processes and relations set in motion by the Chinese state’s effort to move from an economy relying on labor-intensive, export-oriented manufacturing to an S&T-driven economy in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. This drive towards what I term “techno-state capitalism” has included: (1) the proliferation of instruments—from technologies (e.g., algorithms) and techniques (e.g., quantification) to laws—to regulate both work and life; (2) the social, cultural, and economic subordination of all work, workers, and forms of capital deemed “obsolete” or “low-end,” to those valorized as “high-tech” or “high-end”; and (3) the subjection of “low-end” and “high-end” workers and capital to the precarious and despotic rule by instruments.
Drawing on a historic discourse and tradition of conceptualizing the economy as a bird that must be cultivated yet caged by the state, and using a growing arsenal of instruments to advance techno-development, the Chinese state attempted to eliminate “obsolete” sectors and built a first-class “cage” that favored the tech sector over all others. The result is one of the most successful digital economies in the world. But as techno-development has flourished, it has also become increasingly difficult to contain—not only by the state itself, which must now navigate a complex relationship with unruly tech giants empowered by global financial capital, but also in terms of the sweeping expansion of instrumental rationality into all spheres of life. The unchecked rule by instruments prioritizes legibility, valuation, and behavior modification, often ignoring public interest and the rights of citizens, laborers, and businesses in the process, and resulting in alienation, exploitation, uncertainty, and paradoxically, inefficiency. Moreover, these adverse consequences are distributed unevenly among the Chinese population, varying by social class, family origin, and other resources. The working class tends to be subject to the harshest instrumental rule in both the spheres of work and life, but a rising class of technical professionals also pays a high price for their apparent success. Yet, despite these dehumanizing consequences, the shift to techno-state capitalism has not led to large-scale, overt resistance. The gilded façade of the cage that objectifies national and technological progress, combined with people’s engagement with instrumental rule to better position themselves within the cage, has helped the Chinese state maintain political legitimacy and social stability—so far.
The Contentious Public Sphere: Law, Media and Authoritarian Rule in China (Princeton University Press, 2018)
Winner of the 2018 Distinguished Book Award, Sociology of Law Section of the American Sociological Association
Winner of the 2018 Gordon Hirabayashi Human Rights Book Award, Human Rights Section of the American Sociological Association
Winner of the 2014 American Sociological Association Best Dissertation Award
The Contentious Public Sphere in China shows how the Chinese state drew on law, marketized media, and the internet to further an authoritarian project of modernization, but ended up inadvertently creating a nationwide contentious public sphere in China—one the Chinese state must now endeavor to control.
Since the mid-2000s, public opinion and debate in China has become increasingly common and consequential, despite the ongoing censorship of speech and regulation of civil society. How did this happen? In The Contentious Public Sphere in China, Ya-Wen Lei shows how the Chinese state drew on law, the media, and the internet to further an authoritarian project of modernization, but in so doing, inadvertently created a nationwide public sphere in China—one the state must now endeavor to control. Lei examines the influence this unruly sphere has had on Chinese politics and the ways that the state has responded.
Using interviews, newspaper articles, online texts, official documents, and national surveys, Lei shows that the development of the public sphere in China has provided an unprecedented forum for citizens to influence the public agenda, demand accountability from the government, and organize around the concepts of law and rights. She demonstrates how citizens came to understand themselves as legal subjects, legal and media professionals began to collaborate in unexpected ways, and existing conditions of political and economic fragmentation created unintended opportunities for political critique, particularly with the rise of the internet. The emergence of this public sphere—and its uncertain future—is a pressing one with important implications for the political prospects of the Chinese people.
Investigating how individuals learn to use public discourse to influence politics, The Contentious Public Sphere in China offers new possibilities for thinking about the transformation of state-society relations.
The Gilded Cage analyzes the emergent post-industrial society in China currently taking shape due significantly to the Chinese state’s aggressive pursuit of science and technology (S&T)-driven socioeconomic development in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. This period has seen the transformation of the Chinese state, the unprecedented rise of tech capital, the evolution of an asymmetrical yet symbiotic—synergetic yet disciplinary—relationship between the state and tech capital, and, critically, an increasingly prostrate public sphere and civil society.
I develop the concept of the “gilded cage” to capture not so much a literal space as the dynamic processes and relations set in motion by the Chinese state’s effort to move from an economy relying on labor-intensive, export-oriented manufacturing to an S&T-driven economy in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. This drive towards what I term “techno-state capitalism” has included: (1) the proliferation of instruments—from technologies (e.g., algorithms) and techniques (e.g., quantification) to laws—to regulate both work and life; (2) the social, cultural, and economic subordination of all work, workers, and forms of capital deemed “obsolete” or “low-end,” to those valorized as “high-tech” or “high-end”; and (3) the subjection of “low-end” and “high-end” workers and capital to the precarious and despotic rule by instruments.
Drawing on a historic discourse and tradition of conceptualizing the economy as a bird that must be cultivated yet caged by the state, and using a growing arsenal of instruments to advance techno-development, the Chinese state attempted to eliminate “obsolete” sectors and built a first-class “cage” that favored the tech sector over all others. The result is one of the most successful digital economies in the world. But as techno-development has flourished, it has also become increasingly difficult to contain—not only by the state itself, which must now navigate a complex relationship with unruly tech giants empowered by global financial capital, but also in terms of the sweeping expansion of instrumental rationality into all spheres of life. The unchecked rule by instruments prioritizes legibility, valuation, and behavior modification, often ignoring public interest and the rights of citizens, laborers, and businesses in the process, and resulting in alienation, exploitation, uncertainty, and paradoxically, inefficiency. Moreover, these adverse consequences are distributed unevenly among the Chinese population, varying by social class, family origin, and other resources. The working class tends to be subject to the harshest instrumental rule in both the spheres of work and life, but a rising class of technical professionals also pays a high price for their apparent success. Yet, despite these dehumanizing consequences, the shift to techno-state capitalism has not led to large-scale, overt resistance. The gilded façade of the cage that objectifies national and technological progress, combined with people’s engagement with instrumental rule to better position themselves within the cage, has helped the Chinese state maintain political legitimacy and social stability—so far.
The Contentious Public Sphere: Law, Media and Authoritarian Rule in China (Princeton University Press, 2018)
Winner of the 2018 Distinguished Book Award, Sociology of Law Section of the American Sociological Association
Winner of the 2018 Gordon Hirabayashi Human Rights Book Award, Human Rights Section of the American Sociological Association
Winner of the 2014 American Sociological Association Best Dissertation Award
The Contentious Public Sphere in China shows how the Chinese state drew on law, marketized media, and the internet to further an authoritarian project of modernization, but ended up inadvertently creating a nationwide contentious public sphere in China—one the Chinese state must now endeavor to control.
Since the mid-2000s, public opinion and debate in China has become increasingly common and consequential, despite the ongoing censorship of speech and regulation of civil society. How did this happen? In The Contentious Public Sphere in China, Ya-Wen Lei shows how the Chinese state drew on law, the media, and the internet to further an authoritarian project of modernization, but in so doing, inadvertently created a nationwide public sphere in China—one the state must now endeavor to control. Lei examines the influence this unruly sphere has had on Chinese politics and the ways that the state has responded.
Using interviews, newspaper articles, online texts, official documents, and national surveys, Lei shows that the development of the public sphere in China has provided an unprecedented forum for citizens to influence the public agenda, demand accountability from the government, and organize around the concepts of law and rights. She demonstrates how citizens came to understand themselves as legal subjects, legal and media professionals began to collaborate in unexpected ways, and existing conditions of political and economic fragmentation created unintended opportunities for political critique, particularly with the rise of the internet. The emergence of this public sphere—and its uncertain future—is a pressing one with important implications for the political prospects of the Chinese people.
Investigating how individuals learn to use public discourse to influence politics, The Contentious Public Sphere in China offers new possibilities for thinking about the transformation of state-society relations.
